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Abstract
The need to balance austerity with growth policies has put government efficiency high on
the economic policy agenda in Europe. Administrative reforms which boost the efficiency
of the administration can alleviate the trade-off between consolidation and public service
provision. Against such backdrop, this study explores the determinants of efficiency en-
hancing public administration reforms for a panel of EU countries using a novel reform
indicator. The findings support the political-economic reasoning: An economic and fiscal
crisis is a potent catalyst for reforms, but a powerful bureaucracy effectively constrains
the opportunities of a crisis to promote this particular type of reform. Furthermore,
there is evidence for horizontal learning from other EU countries, and for vertical learning
associated with a particular type of EU transfers.
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1 Introduction
The recent European crisis has put the issue of government efficiency high on the economic
policy agenda. With strictly binding government budget constraints the pressure on more
“bang for bucks” from public service provision has grown. Policy measures which cut back
bureaucratic slack and red tape can alleviate the trade-off between consolidation and public
service provision. Hence, reforms aiming at a higher productivity in public service provision,
such as devolution and decentralization strategies, introducing competitive mechanisms within
the public sector, revised budget practices and procedures, performance-oriented approaches
to budgeting and management, and reliance on e-government, could be a substitute for cuts in
spending or tax increases (Curristine et al., 2007).
The empirical public finance literature points to the role of government efficiency in several
crucial respects. Inefficiencies in public administration have been identified as a bottleneck for
firm performance and competitiveness (Austrian Institute of Economic Research, 2012). Based
on a large country sample, Angelopoulos et al. (2008) show that the intensively debated relation
between government size and economic growth is conditional on the efficiency of government
spending. And Heylen et al. (2013) find evidence that attempts for budget consolidation are
likely to be more successful when consolidation programs are adopted by a more efficient govern-
ment apparatus. In their view, efficiency fosters consolidation through at least two channels:
First, efficient governments appear to adopt consolidation programs with a more promising
structure. And second, programs implemented by an efficient administration benefit from a
credibility bonus.
Hence, fostering public sector efficiency is a natural candidate for any long-run growth agenda
in general, and for countries in fiscal trouble in particular. And it is not surprising that ap-
proaches to improve the efficiency of public administration are part of virtually all reform
programs of European governments under fiscal stress. However, it cannot be taken for granted
that reform rhetoric always stands for reform substance. Slack in public service provision is
deeply rooted in bureaucratic incentives, principal-agent problems and political-economic equi-
libria. These equilibria are co-determined by lobby influence and the existence of information
advantages of bureaucrats over voters or their elected representatives. And it is not obvious at
all that economic or fiscal crises change these equilibria towards a more reform friendly outcome.
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On the contrary, times of fiscal austerity may acerbate problems of supervising the bureaucracy
or give bureaucrats a particular power, since politicians urgently need their support for a suc-
cessful crisis management. Therefore, it is unclear to which extent times of economic and fiscal
stress really push government efficiency. Moreover, there is hardly any empirical evidence on
potential political or economic determinants of efficiency improving public sector reforms.
There are at least three closely related and well developed strands in the empirical literature
(briefly surveyed in the next section) which, however, do not focus on efficiency inducing public
sector reforms: First, there is a larger field interested in the timing and extent of reform decisions
in general. Reform issues covered typically are product and labor market, welfare state and tax
reforms whereas efficiency enhancing public sector reforms so far are almost totally neglected.
Second, there is a growing literature which measures efficiency of public service provision in
different federal contexts and looks at economic or political-economic drivers. These studies
aim at understanding the given heterogeneity in jurisdictional efficiency but are hardly helpful
in understanding dynamic changes and reforms. Third, a substantial literature deals with
the drivers of consolidation. These studies, inter alia, are also interested into adjustments of
administrative spending. However, those spending cuts are not directly informative on efficiency
inducing reforms since these cuts may simply represent a reduction of public service provision.
Our study is an innovation to the reform literature as it addresses a neglected but important
topic: the determinants of those reforms which aim at improving the efficiency of the public ad-
ministration for providing public services and raising revenues. We explicitly disregard reforms
changing the extensive margin of the public sector through increasing or decreasing the level of
service provision. Instead, our sole interest is on reforms which potentially change the intensive
margin through an improvement in the technical efficiency of administrative production (see
Bonesronning, 2013, for this distinction in the context of educational reform).
Our study is also novel with respect to the database employed, the European Commission’s
MICREF database. This choice is guided by our focus on efficiency improving public sector
reforms. For that purpose, our reform indicator has to fulfil several requirements: It should
identify a procedural innovation related to public service production or tax administration.
At the same time, it should not be based on these reforms’ economic outcomes which may
be influenced by several other factors. Typical outcome-related reform indicators like public
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spending or number of staff suffer from a fundamental identification problem since exogenous
factors (business cycle, expectations, financial market conditions etc.) may impact the mea-
surable outcome so that the contribution of a preceding reform is hardly recognizable (Wiese,
2014). To some extent, this problem also holds for those reform indicators which like the World
Bank Doing Business Indicators or indicators of economic freedom are based on expert surveys.
These indicators are highly popular as a proxy for reform episodes (e.g., Pitlik and Wirth, 2003;
Heinemann and Tanz, 2008; Rode and Gwartney, 2012; Giuliano et al., 2013; Leibrecht and
Pitlik, 2015). However, expert opinions are also influenced by a country’s overall economic and
social performance.
The search for outcome-unrelated indicators of policy inputs has recently inspired the so
called “narrative approaches” in the empirical literature on fiscal policy (e.g., Romer and Romer,
2010). This literature - through the analysis of narrative records like speeches or parliamentary
debates - tries to identify those changes in fiscal policy which are not motivated by the cyclical
situation and, in this respect, is exogenous. We share this literature’s objective to employ
a reform indicator which has largely the character of a policy input indicator unrelated to
economic outcomes or to anti-cyclical strategies. We calculate our indicator from the European
Commission’s MICREF database limiting the measure to a subset of reform classifications
which target the efficiency of the public administration. The newly created reform indicator
does not solely measure a change in the level of public spending, and it is also not directly driven
by fiscal outcomes such as a possible anti-cyclical spending strategy. The analysis proceeds in
the following steps: First, we give a survey of the related avenues in the literature mentioned
above. In the subsequent theoretical section, we analyze which factors should potentially change
the political-economic equilibria that determine bureaucratic slack and, consequently, derive
testable hypotheses. The empirical part starts with a description of our reform indicators
taken from the MICREF database followed by econometric analyses.
Our results, based on panel estimations of all EU countries in the 2000–2013 period, confirm
our theoretical reasoning: The frequent finding in the empirical reform literature that crisis
induces reforms also holds for public administration reforms as a general pattern. This positive
crisis effect is, however, conditional on our proxies for the power of bureaucracy: With a large
bureaucracy, an economic crisis is less likely to push innovations in public service provision.
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Another finding relates to learning. We observe vertical learning associated with a particular
type of EU transfers, and horizontal learning from the reform examples of other EU countries.
2 Relevant strands in the literature
Over the past decade a growing literature has explored the drivers of structural reforms in in-
dustrial countries. The starting point was the observations that despite a common international
environment characterized by increasing global competition countries differed considerably in
their speed to adjust to these new constraints. The literature’s empirical workhorse is the
study of country panels. Examples are Abiad and Mody (2005), Dreher et al. (2009), Pitlik
and Wirth (2003) or Pitlik (2010). Reforms which have been examined cover financial deregula-
tion, product market opening, trade liberalization, labor market deregulation and adjustments
which make the pension or benefit system more sustainable.
The existing studies focus on a rich set of potential drivers of reforms, for example, the
role of the political leaders’ individual characteristics (Dreher et al., 2009), the role of trust
(Heinemann and Tanz, 2008) or the constraints resulting from the euro introduction (Duval
and Elmeskov, 2006). Beyond these particular interests of single studies, there are, however,
common patterns in the literature: First, the occurrence of reform is typically modelled to
depend on the institutional starting point which, if highly inefficient, indicates a high need
for reforms. Second, the study designs frequently allow for regional diffusion and learning of
reforms. The argument is that reforms in neighboring countries enable learning or activate
yardstick competition. Third, crisis proxies are regularly included since times of economic or
social crises are seen as windows of opportunities for far reaching institutional change. The
argument is that a crisis indicates voters that the status quo is no longer an available option
whereas good economic times strengthen the status quo bias (see Heinemann and Grigoriadis,
2013, for a full discussion). This empirical reform literature with its key findings and empirical
testing designs is a crucial starting point for us. Nevertheless it has one blank spot since it has
neglected the determinants of efficiency enhancing public administration reforms which is our
focus.
Whereas the reform literature has paid no attention to issues of public sector efficiency there
is a huge literature explicitly dealing with the measurement and comparison of efficiency in
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public service provision (Afonso et al., 2005; O’Mahony and Stevens, 2006). This literature’s
motivation is that improved technical efficiency can be utilized for better or more productive
services, or - especially in times of pressing fiscal consolidation needs - to a reduction of govern-
ment resource use and overall tax burden. In line with this idea, Angelopoulos et al. (2008) find
that what really matters for economic growth is not government size per se, but the country’s
size-efficiency mix.
Aggregate measurement of public sector performance is receiving increasing attention in
certain sectors such as R&D, health and education (Afonso and St.Aubyn, 2005), but attention
for the administrative bureaucratic part of government, or even for government in general is
still rather limited. Adam et al. (2011) show that institutional factors and governance quality
play a major role in explaining relative government efficiency at the country level; Geys et al.
(2010); Asatryan and Witte (2015) provide evidence for the local level.
Reform attempts to improve efficiency of public administration cover an enormously wide
range of possible measures. In fact, industrial countries’ bureaucracies have undergone sub-
stantial changes over the last decades, and changes were often implemented (e.g., Pollitt and
Bouckaert, 2011; Curristine et al., 2007). Innovative activities include new methods of providing
services in interaction with users, a re-organization of work responsibilities, new support and
logistics systems and new management systems. Though reform attempts differ significantly,
most instruments have been discussed under the umbrella term of New Public Management,
most prominently electronic government, human resources management, stronger performance
orientation, service orientation and institutional re-organization of administration (decentral-
ization, agencification, market-related mechanisms), aiming simultaneously at an improvement
of internal public sector processes and external relationship with citizens and business.
While it is still not clear to which extent do these reforms contribute to increased public ad-
ministration efficiency, this literature is nevertheless an important motivation for our approach.
It emphasizes that there are indeed high potential rewards for administrative reforms. However,
this literature has merely an interest into the long-run drivers of (in)efficiencies. Our focus is
different: We want to find out under which conditions sudden efficiency increasing reforms can
materialize.
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A third related strand in the literature is concerned with the drivers and strategies of fiscal
adjustment. Over the recent years, a vast number of studies have contributed to a better
understanding of when, why and how fiscal consolidations occur and what are the main factors
for success of failure of such policies (cf. more recent surveys by Price, 2010; Barrios et al., 2010;
Molna´r, 2012). Among the best established results in that field of research is that very high
sovereign debt levels are supportive of initiating a budgetary stabilization. That consolidation
efforts are triggered by unsustainable debt or deficits comes hardly as a surprise, as this is simply
a variant of the crisis hypothesis discussed above. If mounting public debt is associated with
increasing costs of borrowing, financial markets may simply “force” governments to consolidate
(Mierau et al., 2007). Cahuc and Carcillo (2012) investigate in particular under which conditions
the public wage bill can be reduced. In their analysis of OECD countries from 1995 to 2009 the
authors differentiate between periods of fiscal drift, with simultaneous increases of government
wage bill shares and budget deficits, and episodes of fiscal tightening, in which both the wage
bill share of the public sector and public deficits decrease. Cahuc and Carcillo (2012) find that
fiscal drift episodes occur more frequently during booms than during recessions, while fiscal
tightening occurs more often during recessions. Moreover, they report that fiscal tightening
during recessions and election years is less frequent when union coverage rates are high. The
notion is that unions are typically opposed to wage or hiring freezes, and powerful unions can
block public employment cuts in situations of negative GDP shock, thus delaying adjustment.
Heylen et al. (2011, 2013) report that curbing government employment and public sector wages
may contribute substantially to successful consolidation, but only when efficiency in public
administration is low. Put differently, downsizing an already efficient public sector is not a
good strategy to consolidate budgets.
This empirical literature on the timing and drivers of consolidation is obviously related to
our interests. Reforms which boost efficiency in public service production can contribute to
spending cuts and consolidation. However, this literature has the conceptual limitation that it
does not pay attention whether an observable decrease of expenditure originates from a cut in
services or costs savings due to a gain in efficiency.
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3 The political economy of administrative reforms
Undoubtedly, reforms which make public service provision more efficient are welfare improving
and beneficial to the society as a whole. It is much less obvious, whether these reforms are in the
interest of all important veto players and interest groups and, in particular, of those who make
their living in the public sector. With a Niskanen-perspective of budget maximizing bureaucrats
(Niskanen, 1971), cost reductions in the provision of a given level of public services should meet
resistance as savings may lead to budget and staff cuts. Even if lifetime civil servants are
well-protected insiders without unemployment risk for themselves (which is not necessarily the
case for public sector employees in general) the cuts will in turn lower bureaucrats’ self-esteem,
reputation, potential for patronage and the chances for promotion. This explains that even a
life-time civil servant can be opposed to efficiency improvements.
In addition to this simple budget maximization argument there is a second, more subtle
point why efficiency inducing innovations may meet the resistance of bureaucrats. Bureaucratic
power vis-a`-vis voters and their elected representatives rests on the assumption that there is
an information asymmetry and a consequential monitoring problem: Public agencies often
are better informed on their cost functions than parliamentarians who have the supervisory
role. The larger this information asymmetry the more potential for bureaucrats to benefit from
organizational slack, i.e. obtaining a budget above what is required to produce a certain output
at minimum costs (Migue´ and Be´langer, 1974).
The problem with public management reforms from the perspective of slack-seeking bureau-
crats is that reforms which have a potential for cost reductions also foster higher cost trans-
parency and help monitoring administrative performance. This could hold, for instance, for
measures promoting e-government, better evaluation and monitoring or managerial accounting
systems. Hence, civil servants may not only resist efficiency enhancing reforms just because
they fear for their budgets but also because their fear the resulting higher transparency and
the consequential loss of discretion in their use of the budget.
Empirical evidence supports the expectation that public employees tend to be particularly
skeptical on public sector reforms. For Norwegian reforms aiming at privatization and com-
petitive tendering of public services, Rattso and Sorensen (2004) exploit survey data to show
that, compared to the rest of the Norwegian population, public employees prefer less reforms.
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Moreover, these employees assign larger weights to these reform issues in their vote decision and
may, therefore, be effective swing voters who are able to block a reform even if it is preferred
by a majority.
Overall, we would therefore expect that effective resistance against public sector reforms will
increase with the size of a country’s bureaucracy. Hence, our first testable hypothesis is as
follows:
H1: Countries with a higher share of public sector employees are less likely to pursue
efficiency enhancing administrative reforms.
As reported in the literature survey section above, the link between crisis (indicated by a
recession, high unemployment and/or fiscal imbalances) and reform is one of the robust findings
across very different reform contexts. A crisis is supposed to foster a sense of urgency and to
overcome the status quo-bias.
Deep crises are expected to reduce political opposition to reforms by lowering payoffs of ob-
struction and increasing payoffs of a policy change. In the wake of a crisis, status quo preserving
interest groups may be more likely to accept uncertainties associated with policy liberalization,
and governments also have a higher propensity to bear the higher risks of temporary economic
hardships during structural policy changes.
However, given the particular and direct role of government finances for the provision of
public services, it cannot be taken for granted that a fiscal crisis (i.e. a situation of high debt
and/or a high current deficit) really paves the way for cost saving administrative innovations.
The following considerations even point to particularly large difficulties of boosting public sector
efficiency in a situation of crisis.
A first argument is related to the budget-maximization view described above. In good fiscal
times, public employees can realistically hope that a more efficient service production will
not lead to future budget cuts because increasing economies may be used to expand the level
of service production (in terms of quantity and/or quality). This expectation would lower
their resistance against reforms. With urgent consolidation needs, by contrast, the rational
expectation is that a cheaper production will be fully used to reduce bureaucratic staff and cut
administrative spending. For public sector employees with imperfect employment protection
this implies an increasing risk of job loss. And for life time civil servants the combination of
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crisis and higher efficiency in the public sector signals a likely reduction of agency budgets,
prestige and income. Hence, bureaucratic resistance against reform should be fiercer in bad
than in good times.
A second argument relates to the information asymmetry between bureaucrats and politi-
cians. Hugh-Jones (2014) points out that consolidation aggravates information problem of
bureaucratic supervision because it becomes harder to detect inefficient agencies. Efficient
agencies operate at the efficiency frontier so that they have to decrease service provision if
budgets are cut. Inefficient agencies can simply imitate this behavior. The resulting pooling
equilibrium offers no hint to distinguish between efficient and inefficient units. By contrast, a
distinction is easier with growing budgets in good times: inefficient agencies separate themselves
from efficient ones since the latter increase output more than the former.
A third argument relates to the crucial role a country’s public administration plays in times of
far-reaching reform needs which comprise labor markets, goods markets and the welfare state.
For the design of such complex and interdependent reform packages, for the related legislation
and, finally, for reform implementation, the government urgently needs the full support of its
bureaucracy. Hence, times of far-reaching reform needs may be exactly the time when loyal
civil servants are politically most important. That’s why a far-reaching crisis - especially a
fiscal crisis with urgent consolidation efforts - may be exactly the wrong time to take on the
interests of civil servants.
Thus, we do not have a clear sign expectation on the impact of crisis in our specific reform
context, since there are counterbalancing forces at work. With respect to the traditional crisis
hypothesis, serious economic and fiscal problems should equally ease reforms in the public sector
as they do for labor market or welfare state reforms. However, given the particular concerns
of bureaucrats the resistance of this key interest group should be particularly fierce in times
of budgetary stress. In consequence, we have to develop our hypothesis in an indirect way.
We can exploit the fact that the possibilities of the bureaucrats to obstruct reforms should
be conditional on its political power. With a small bureaucracy, the electoral share of public
sector employees is small, which should reduce its potential to block reforms. Hence, we expect
that the crisis-specific resistance of public employees will be increasing with the size of the
bureaucracy. This leads us to our second testable hypothesis:
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H2: An economic and fiscal crisis is the more likely to increase the short-run oc-
currence of efficiency enhancing public administration reforms the lower the power
of the bureaucracy.
Further predictions relate to learning processes which are part of any reform process. First,
there might be learning related to the impact of the financial and technical assistance provided
by the EU for its member countries (“vertical learning”). It is a standard assumption in the
context of development economics that the inflow of development aid should also be related
to an import of know-how (e.g., Dreher, 2009). Heckelman and Knack (2008) yet find that
higher aid slowed liberalizing economic reform despite foreign aid being frequently granted
to help developing countries in such reforms. Equal ambiguous consideration may apply in
the EU context to cohesion spending which is - besides agricultural subsidies - the second
priority of the EU budget. Cohesion spending through the EU structural funds claims to boost
the growth prospect of lagging European regions and countries through stimulating deficient
growth factors. If this policy has also recognized that an inefficient public administration is a
significant growth impediment it should have been helpful to alleviate this growth bottleneck.
However, cohesion spending might on the contrary also serve as a transfer which finances higher
costs in the recipient country. Thus, the test of the following hypothesis on possible vertical
learning will indicate to which extent the beneficial view prevails.
H3: Countries which benefit to a larger extent from EU cohesion spending should
be more likely to reform their public administration.
A further learning-related reform driver might be due to the experience of neighbors (“hori-
zontal learning”). Successful reform examples in other neighboring or similar countries will re-
duce ex ante reform uncertainty. In our context of public sector reforms, the resulting yardstick
competition (Besley and Case, 1995) may also weaken the information asymmetries between
voters/parliamentarians on the one hand and bureaucrats on the other hands.
H4: Efficiency enhancing administrative reforms in neighboring countries should
make this type of reforms more likely.
A final hypothesis is one also frequently found in the literature on the political economy of
economic reforms in general. The idea is to test for potential electoral cycles in the frequency
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of reforms with the question of whether public administration reforms are postponed from
pre-election to post-election periods when political constrains are more relaxed.
H5: Efficiency enhancing administrative reforms are less (more) likely to take place
in pre- (post-) election periods.
Testing these five hypotheses is our key interest in the subsequent econometric testing for
which we need an indicator for an efficiency enhancing public administration reform. We
motivate and describe our choice in the next section.
4 MICREF database of reforms
We construct our main variable of interest - the frequency of public administration reforms
for each country and year - using qualitative information on microeconomic reforms across EU
countries from the MICREF database.1 MICREF collects data on various reforms hierarchically
classified into policy domains, policy fields, areas of policy intervention, and, at the lowest level,
into reform areas. We carefully select 13 reform areas that we think have a clear and direct
relation with reforming the public administration. Figure 1 plots the evolution of the average
number of public administration reforms from 2000 to 2012, as well as their breakdown into
the selected 13 reform areas.2 Appendix 2 lists the detailed descriptions of the reform areas
that we classify as being directly relevant to reforming the public administration.
To visually illustrate the data, in Figure 2 we plot the yearly evolution of public administra-
tion and all structural reforms for each country. The sample covered is 2000-12 for EU-15 and
2004-12 for EU-27. Along the frequency of reforms we also plot the unemployment rate which,
from a visual inspection, seems to be positively correlated with reform activity. This relation,
however, is subject to heterogeneity across countries, which we will study more systematically
in the following sections.
As discussed in the introduction one novelty of this paper is to adopt count data on reforms
rather than indicator based variables capturing the stringency of regulation and institutions.
On the downside, the latter measures may perform better when making cross-time and -country
1MICREF is made publicly available by the European Commission at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_
finance/indicators/economic_reforms/micref/
2Details of the dataset are available at MICREF’s user guide: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/
db_indicators/micref/documents/user_guide_en.pdf
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Figure 1: Per-country average number of public administration reforms by year and reform
area
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comparisons since the level and change of such indicators can have a similar economic inter-
pretation. With count data the researcher is left to assume that, on average, two reforms are
always better than one without much consideration on the weight attributed to reforms of dif-
ferent size and significance. Although MICREF aims to build a systematic dataset of reforms
collected and coded in a unified framework - a second drawback that is usually also typical to
qualitative datasets - is that it cannot be ruled out that the reporting standards of the member
states may differ.
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Table 1: Reform-level descriptive statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Days between Share of Share of Share of Share with Co-financing Share of Share being Share Share of
decision and regional temporaryEU-imposed EU rate of pilot part of being being
implementationmeasures measures regulation funding national gov.measuresreform-packagemonitoredevaluated
PA reform 174.3 0.046 0.097 0.138 0.049 0.915 0.089 0.545 0.240 0.111
N=621 353 12 25 35 12 39 23 164 117 69
Other reform 197.8 0.181 0.305 0.090 0.191 0.782 0.133 0.506 0.151 0.077
N=3620 1714 150 235 67 135 159 95 560 492 278
However, despite these limitations, MICREF’s data on the frequency of reforms offer a num-
ber of attractive features. First, these are policy-oriented variables measuring real changes in
policy. The indicator based reform variables, on the other hand, are only indirect measures of
reforms as they are usually derived by time-differencing the stock variables on the stringency
of regulation and institutions. Second, compared to survey based indicators like the World
Bank’s Doing Business, by construction, it is less susceptible to fluctuations in the subjective
assessment of countries. Expert assessments from outside are likely to be heavily influenced
by a country’s current economic performance or political events (like, for example, changes
in government). Moreover, there appears to be a relatively rigid pre-selection process by the
Commission as to which reforms are listed in the database. Therefore, our reform indicator is
less output-distorted. Third, indicator based variables often take into account a subset of reg-
ulatory or institutional aspects, where public administration may not be distinguishable from
the rest or may even not be part of the data. MICREF allows setting a clear and transparent
distinction between public administration and other reform areas. Since we are especially in-
terested in analyzing the reform process, a third advantage of MICREF is that it gives detailed
reform-level information on specific policy measures.
Some of these reform-level information is summarized in Table 1 separately for public admin-
istration (PA) and all other reforms. For example, column 1 shows that on average it takes 174
days to implement a public administration reforms counting from the day when the decisions
was made, which is somewhat faster than in the case of other reforms. It can be seen that
public administration reforms are seldom being implemented as temporary or pilot measures
compared to other reforms (columns: 3 and 7), they are also usually national in scope rather
than being regional measures (column: 2). The implementation of such reforms are also twice
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more likely to be subject to monitoring and evaluation, mostly done so by independent bodies
(column: 9-10). About every 7th reform in the public administration is a transposition of EU
regulation which is somewhat higher than in other reform areas, however the funding source of
these reforms primarily comes from national sources (column: 4-6)
Table 2: Budgetary impact of reforms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Revenue impact of reforms Expenditure impact of reforms
Neutral Increasing Decreasing Amount (EUR) Neutral Increasing Decreasing Amount (EUR)
PA reform 0.889 0.058 0.053 10,786 0.534 0.356 0.111 572,892
N= 152 10 9 165 111 74 23 178
Other reform 0.664 0.114 0.222 26,571 0.284 0.670 0.046 436,915
N= 466 80 156 589 283 667 46 771
It is also of interest to look at the (estimated) direct budgetary impact of these reforms.
Table 2 shows that public administration reforms are more often cost-neutral for the budget
both on its revenue and expenditure sides (columns: 1 and 5). The average expenditure impact
of public administration reforms, however, are not negligible in cases when these are not cost-
neutral and amount to about 570 thousand EUR on average versus 435 thousand EUR for other
types of reforms (column: 8).
Before proceeding to our main analysis, that is the determinants of public administration
reforms, in the remainder of this section we run so-called first-stage regressions to test the
possible impact of our newly created reform measures. As our independent variable we take
two country level indices provided by the World Bank, namely the ease of doing business
indicator and the government effectiveness index from the World Governance Indicators. We
then explain these two indicators by the number of reforms in different policy fields defined
by MICREF conditional on several macro-economic controls. This test substantiates to which
extent administrative reforms covered by MICREF constitute indeed significant changes to
public administration efficiency so that these reforms induce changes of the established proxies
of the quality of public administration. Table 3 collects the estimates. The significant and
positive correlations between the number of public administration reforms on one side, and
both the doing business and the government effectiveness indicators on the other side (columns:
1 and 2), show that our main variable indeed has substantial effects on outcome indicators. By
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running similar regression with reforms in different policy fields we are also able to show that
public administration reforms are actually one of the most important and effective policies in
improving both indicators. This justifies our confidence that MICREF reforms are significant
and of particular information value to assess efficiency enhancing reform activity in European
public administrations.
5 Empirical strategy
Our baseline specification takes the following form:
PublicAdminReformsit = α1 + α2 ∗ Crisisit + α3 ∗ AdminSizeit+
+α4 ∗ Crisisit ∗ AdminSizeit + α5 ∗ Controlsit + µi + ηt + it
(1)
where the dependent variable is the number of public administration reforms in country i at
time t. Crisis are a number of crisis-variables of interest entering the equation one-by-one,
these are: GDP growth rate, unemployment rate, general government gross debt, and general
government primary budget balances. AdminSize captures the size of the public administration,
which in the baseline specifications we measure as the compensation share of employees in the
core sectors of government administration. We prefer the compensation figures to data on
public employment, as internationally comparable data on government employment are not
readily available due to substantial differences in counting and collection methods. For the
purpose of robustness test we use, alternatively, the compensation share of employees in the
general government (rather than the core administration which is a narrower definition of the
bureaucracy). Controls is a vector of independent variables with α5 a vector of parameters of
the same dimension. µi represents a full set of country fixed effects to account for unobserved
heterogeneity across countries, ηt are time fixed effects to capture time-specific shocks affecting
all countries similarly, and it is the error-term. The summary statistics along with short
descriptions and sources of the employed variables are presented in Table A1 of the Appendix.
We apply a panel OLS with two-way fixed effects to estimate our baseline equation. Although
our independent variable is categorial (and not continuous) such that non-linear models may
better fit the data, in the baseline estimations we refrain from applying count data models.
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The main reason is that within estimators for ordered categorial variables require applying
a recoding strategy to reduce the independent variable to a binary variable.3 Since we find
it crucial to control for individual unobserved heterogeneity we simply specify a fixed effects
linear model, therefore avoiding the latter simplification of the reform variable. We are also
mainly interested in the relative effects (rather than absolute size of parameter estimates) so
that a linear approximation of the (possibly non-linear) underlying true model does not seem
to be too restrictive. In this way, we also follow the practical approaches taken, for example,
by Di Tella et al. (2001), Scheve and Slaughter (2004) and Senik (2004). Nevertheless, as a
robustness test we also estimate the baseline equation with a conditional fixed-effects Poisson
model.
6 Results
6.1 Main results
The baseline results are collected in Table 4, where we find strong support for our two central
propositions. First, in line with the hypothesis H1 we find that the size of the bureaucracy in
year t is significantly negatively correlated with the number of public administration reforms
in year t+1. This result holds for both of the measures of bureaucracy, which are the compen-
sation share of employees in the core public administration (columns: 1-8) and in the general
government (columns: 9-16).
Second, we also have evidence that economic and financial crises induce more reforms. This
relation holds consistently for two of our crisis measure – unemployment rate (columns: 3-4 &
11-12) and general government gross debt (columns: 5-6 & 13-14) – but not for GDP growth
rate and general government budget balance.
Third, in line with the hypothesis H2 we see that a crisis is more effective in inducing
reforms the smaller the size of the public administration. The marginal effects of interaction
variables are plotted in Figure 3. GDP growth and budget balances do not seem to have
an effect on reform activity that is significantly different from zero conditional on size of the
3For a review, see, Geishecker and Riedl (2014), and for a recently developed such method, see, Baetschmann
et al. (2014).
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Figure 3: Marginal effects of crisis variables on reform activity conditional on the compensa-
tion share of employees in the administration (a-d) or the government (e-h)
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(b) Unemployment rate
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(h) GG budget balance
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Figures (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g) and (h) plot the marginal effects of interaction terms estimated, respectively,
in columns 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14 and 16 of table 4.
public administration.4 On the other hand, unemployment and debt do have a significantly
positive conditional effect on public administration reforms when the administration’s share of
total compensation is below-average (Figures 3 b & c). This also holds when using the general
government’s share of total compensation as an alternative proxy for the size of the bureaucracy
(Figures 3 f & g).
6.2 Robustness tests
The robustness of our baseline results are tested in Table 5. In columns (1)-(8) we estimate a
non-linear version of the baseline equation using a conditional fixed-effects Poisson model. The
previous results – related to the positive association of crisis variables with the frequency of
public administration reforms and the conditionality of this relation on the size of the bureau-
cracy – are confirmed. In columns (9)-(16), as a placebo we take all reforms from MICREF
– not just public administration reforms – as the dependent variable. While we observe that
higher unemployment and debt are significantly associated with more reforms in other policy
areas (columns: 11 & 13), the size of the public administration is not a significant driver of
reforms anymore. The evidence hints to the direction that this special interest group opposes
only to those reforms that clearly fall under the subject matter of its own self-interest.
The issue of reverse causality between reforms and the size of the bureaucracy maybe of
further concern. That is compensation share of employees in the administration may decrease
if the efficiency-increasing public administration reforms involve government wage bill cuts.
Our data allows to directly test this proposition. As described in Table 2 reforms can be
distinguished according to whether they are expected to result in positive, negative, or neutral
costs for the budget. In Table 6 we regress these three types of reforms one-by-one on our main
variable capturing the size of the bureaucracy. As expected, public administration reforms with
positive budgetary costs have a positive sign in the first two years (columns: 4-6) while reforms
that imply positive savings for the budget have a negative sign (columns: 7-10). However, only
the latter correlation is statistically significant and only so for a simultaneous relation (column:
7). We do not find evidence that either cost-neutral reforms which consist the majority of
4The average effect of the interaction between growth and government’s share of total compensation is signif-
icant (column: 10), however Figure 3(e) shows that this relation holds only for very high values of government’s
share of compensation (i.e. over 35%), which in fact lies outside of our sample (Table A1).
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reforms (columns: 10-12) or all public administration reforms taken together (columns: 1-3)
effect the size of the administration.
While in Table 6 we find some evidence that public administration reforms which imply
positive savings for the budget may actually target at reducing the size of the administration,
this effect takes place immediately in the same year the reform was implemented and does
not carry on to the proceeding years. Also taking into account that such reforms consist the
minority of public administration reforms, we conclude that, in general, reverse causality is not
the driver of the main results presented in Section 6.1.
Table 6: Test for reverse causality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
VARIABLES Compensation share of employees in the administration in year:
t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2
All PA reforms -0.008 -0.006 0.017
(0.017) (0.015) (0.018)
Positive-cost PA reforms 0.048 0.010 -0.100
(0.054) (0.074) (0.075)
Negative-cost PA reforms -0.132* -0.043 0.043
(0.075) (0.031) (0.050)
Neutral-cost PA reforms 0.000 -0.022 0.014
(0.014) (0.014) (0.029)
Unemployment rate 0.037 0.014 -0.005 0.037 0.014 -0.006 0.036 0.014 -0.005 0.037 0.014 -0.005
(0.028) (0.027) (0.021) (0.028) (0.027) (0.022) (0.028) (0.027) (0.022) (0.028) (0.027) (0.022)
GG gross debt 0.005 0.001 -0.000 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.001 0.000
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010)
Log population 5.252 6.806** 8.744*** 5.317 6.857** 8.700*** 5.371 6.881** 8.724*** 5.310 6.807** 8.772***
(3.680) (2.944) (2.303) (3.638) (2.922) (2.300) (3.571) (2.894) (2.322) (3.651) (2.929) (2.288)
Working age population -0.102 -0.149 -0.212* -0.103 -0.150 -0.207* -0.122 -0.158 -0.197* -0.103 -0.156 -0.205*
(0.162) (0.145) (0.113) (0.161) (0.144) (0.113) (0.161) (0.144) (0.109) (0.161) (0.145) (0.115)
Observations 313 286 258 313 286 258 313 286 258 313 286 258
R-squared 0.259 0.278 0.359 0.258 0.277 0.359 0.270 0.279 0.359 0.258 0.279 0.358
Number of country 27 27 26 27 27 26 27 27 26 27 27 26
F 39.82 55.63 72.54 42.52 59.33 73.83 52.57 38.84 81.24 42.83 71.92 83.70
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: All regressions include country and time fixed effects (not reported). Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and
are clustered at the level of countries.
6.3 Extensions
In Table 7 we look at vertical and horizontal learning to test our hypotheses H3 and H4.
In columns (1)-(10) we study vertical learning and test whether EU-transfers increase reform
activity. Here we differentiate between four different aggregates of EU cohesion spending: first,
24
the total amounts of structural spending, second, the expenditure of structural funds only,
third, the more limited spending on the convergence objective benefiting only the poor regions
and, fourth, a tiny single spending item concentrated on technical assistance to member states.
Interestingly, only for the latter small item (i.e., on average less than 0.15% of GDP) there is a
highly significant effect. By contrast, a receipt of higher amounts of cohesion spending in total
is not associated with a measurable higher public administration reform activity.
Next to this effective vertical policy we also find some evidence for horizontal learning. We
calculate spatial indicators of reform activity in other EU countries weighted by distance and
per capita GDP (columns 10-14) and, alternatively, by distance and the public sector efficiency
(columns 15-16) measure developed by Afonso et al. (2005). The evidence hints towards sig-
nificant positive spatial spillovers from other EU countries for reform activity in general, and
even more so for public administration reforms in particular.5
There may be further potentially intervening political factors that impact reform decisions.
The next Table 8 tests for electoral cycles in the frequency of both public administration and
other structural reforms, a hypothesis formulated in H5. We extend the typical results of
the literature on political economy of reforms to public administration reforms (columns: 1-
5) by observing less (not more) public administration reforms in pre-election (election) years.
Symmetrically, we find evidence that public administration reforms are significantly more likely
to take place after elections. Such post-electoral “honeymoon-effect” also holds for other types
of structural reforms classified in MICREF (columns: 6-10).
5This evidence is also robust to other weighting schemes, such as population size. Note that in these models
of horizontal learning we leave out the time fixed effects as they are likely to be correlated with the spatial
reform variables.
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Table 8: Electoral cycles in public administration vis-a-vis other structural reforms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES Public administration reforms in year: All reforms in year:
t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2
Election year dummy -0.040 -0.418** -0.101 0.083 0.376* 0.028 -0.282 -1.095 0.424 1.311*
(0.210) (0.188) (0.206) (0.160) (0.195) (0.817) (0.664) (0.756) (0.702) (0.708)
Comp admin employess 0.192 -0.206 -0.364 -0.420 -1.061*** -0.768 -1.375 -1.088 -0.826 -1.469
(0.184) (0.226) (0.252) (0.337) (0.409) (0.604) (0.989) (0.919) (1.142) (1.439)
GDP growth 0.002 0.019 0.068 0.095** 0.008 -0.067 -0.057 -0.111 0.201 0.219
(0.037) (0.037) (0.051) (0.038) (0.045) (0.075) (0.148) (0.120) (0.147) (0.156)
Unemployment rate -0.069 -0.014 0.054 0.167*** 0.233*** -0.153 -0.008 0.040 0.343** 0.452*
(0.050) (0.045) (0.047) (0.048) (0.060) (0.184) (0.190) (0.161) (0.159) (0.249)
Log population -0.298 -1.733 -8.644** -7.256* -6.026 -34.485** -32.356 -42.160** -34.264** -27.313*
(2.427) (3.891) (4.234) (3.850) (3.994) (14.488) (19.688) (17.310) (15.900) (16.053)
Working age population 0.043 0.130 0.211 0.260 0.312 0.528 0.463 1.071 1.255 1.168
(0.182) (0.255) (0.252) (0.252) (0.329) (0.854) (1.183) (1.046) (0.999) (1.068)
Observations 256 283 310 307 281 256 283 310 307 281
R-squared 0.265 0.256 0.225 0.238 0.280 0.408 0.366 0.349 0.357 0.358
Number of country 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27
F 6.039 6.947 5.281 12.57 6.846 36.21 28.32 27.91 18.96 23.31
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: All regressions include country and time fixed effects (not reported). Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and
are clustered at the level of countries.
7 Conclusion
This is the first study which explores the determinants of efficiency enhancing public sector
reforms. The experience in the European crisis countries has pointed to an ineffective public
sector as one of the crucial impediments to economic recovery. Accordingly, a better under-
standing for the constraints of administrative reforms is highly desirable. Our results indicate
that unlike the case in other reform contexts it cannot be taken for granted that a deep crisis
prepares the ground for overcoming institutional deficiencies. At least if the bureaucracy is
large and powerful, the crisis-reform-link is absent in the context of public administration re-
forms. The result for the role of EU cohesion spending is revealing: It is less the high spending
volumes from structural funds which appears to increase the frequency of efficiency enhancing
reforms in the public administration. This supports the view that EU structural funds, with
their preoccupation with physical infrastructure, may have neglected the bottleneck of deficient
administrative capacities in the recipient countries. Instead, a tiny but better targeted item of
cohesion spending is associated with measurable reforms.
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Appendix A2: Classification of public administration reforms
1. Reducing administrative and financial burdens for start-ups in general: Measures not
specifically addressing ’One-stop contact points’, ’Costs for setting up a business’, ’Minimise
start-up requirements’ or ’Capital requirements’.
2. One-stop contact points: Measures aimed at creating / improving one-stop contact points.
One-stop points are expected to reduce the number of walks to public institutions to set up a
business (“shoeleather costs” for entrepreneurs) and / or to deliver documents related to the
start-up of a business, e.g. the electronic delivery of documents.
3. Minimise start-up requirements: Measures related to changes or simplification of manda-
tory procedures during the pre-registration and registration phase of an enterprise or a pub-
lic limited company. Examples are requirements to obtain specific certificates, registration
of domicile of a business, founding deeds, approval by authorities (tax agencies, commercial
court), notification of tax offices, VAT offices, statistical offices, local authorities of registra-
tion, registration with trade association / chamber of commerce, legal announcement. These
factors usually determine the days needed to set-up a business.
4. Efficiency of the legal system in general: Measures not specifically addressing ‘Enforcement
of contracts’ or ‘Speedy settlement’.
5.Enforcement of contracts: Measures that: (i) clarify responsibilities between different fed-
eral levels of legislation; (ii) simplify and strengthen enforcement procedures (such as improve-
ment of the prosecution system and legal aid); (iii) clarify existing legislation; (iv) combat late
payments in commercial transactions; (v) ease the access to courts (e.g. reduction of court fees
and reimbursements, compensation procedures).
6. Speedy settlement: Measures aimed at increasing the speed of settlements such as acts
on accelerating legal procedures. Measures to increase the capacities of the legal system (more
effective organisation of courts, introduction of e-Government tools in the judicial system) are
also recorded here.
7. Administrative regulation in general: Measures not specifically addressing ’Measuring
and/or reducing administrative costs’, ’Improving the quality of regulations’, ’E-Government’
or ’Rationalising public administrative services’.
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8. Improving the quality of regulations: Concrete measures aimed at simplifying and clarifying
the existing legislation or making it more efficient (e.g. “Better regulation programmes”).
Preliminary steps, such as an undertaking of a regulatory impact assessment, could also be
registered here.
9. E-Government: Measures aimed at expanding the government’s use of ICT (information
and communication technologies) to exchange information and services with enterprises (e.g. es-
tablishment of platforms for the submission of electronic documents); also named Government-
to-Business (G2B) e-Government. The most important anticipated benefits of e-Government
applied to the administration include improved efficiency, convenience and better accessibility.
A number of e-Government measures are not to be recorded under this category.
10. Rationalising public administrative services: Measures directed towards achieving economies
of scale within the public administration such as reforms of the size / number of municipalities
and regions, and clarifying responsibilities between different governmental levels. Moreover,
measures aimed at expanding the government’s use of ICT to exchange information and ser-
vices with other arms of government (i.e. Government-to-Government (G2G) initiatives such
as common information exchange networks for several institutions).
11. Simplification of tax system: Measures aiming to reduce the time and cost of complying
with fiscal obligations. These can be measures reducing the administrative burden related to
taxation procedures such as delivering tax documents by electronic means (e-taxation).
12. Systematic monitoring: Establishment of monitoring institutions, monitoring procedures
or evaluation methods for R&D activities.
13. Modernisation of the management: These are measures that (a) modernise the public
R&D agencies, (b) establish or reform advisory bodies on R&D, (c) modernise the management
of research institutions and universities.
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